In this paper we show that domestic economic and political characteristics can explain why some countries established a Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and others not. We find that 1) the existence of natural resources profits, 2) the government structure and 3) the ability to invest in a socially beneficial way in the domestic economy can explain this choice. At the same time these same factors do not relate to the size of the national savings. We use a sample of countries that established a SWF in the period 1998-2008 and compare them to those that did not set up a fund in the same period. The results suggest that SWFs tend to be established in autocratically run countries that have difficulties finding suitable opportunities for domestic investments.
Introduction
The aggregate size of assets under management of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) has been stable over the period 2014-2016 at around US$ 7.4 trillion, with no new establishments of any (major) SWF over the last 5 years. With the maturing of these new major financial vehicles, the time has come to consider carefully what have been the political and economic forces contributing to the blossoming of SWFs over the last decades. Better understanding of what gave rise to SWFs' emergence is the roadmap of this paper and should incidentally shed some light on their potential long run developments.
Since SWFs have proven to be persistent government bodies (we are not aware of any SWF that disbanded in recent times), it is relevant to understand what factors determined their establishments. However, SWFs vary greatly in terms of asset under management, structure, management and objectives. This is not very surprising. Each country has its own internal processes that give rise to policy outcomes, such as the decision to establish a SWF (Orihuela, 2013; Yi-Chong and Bahgat, 2010) . We aim to capture the broad strokes in history that can explain why 16 countries established a SWF in the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] and many others did not.
A number of articles have been written in normative fashion on the optimal savings decisions for countries rich in non-renewable natural resources. Economic theory advises that one should save temporary income to finance long-term investments that reap permanently higher consumption. This principle is quite strong even while one can account for various country and market specific aspects such as capital scarcity, domestic investment absorptive capacity, political heterogeneity and the volatility of resource revenue. We aim to provide evidence that these 'optimal' policies appear to have driven the establishments of SWFs. In this way, this article is one of the few that provides an empirical analysis on this issue (for an exception see van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2016) .
This article tests whether the surge of SWF establishments was determined by the government structure and the ability to invest profitably in the domestic economy, while conditioning on the availability of resource rents. Income from exhaustible natural resources are a pre-condition for many, but not all, SWFs, because their exploitation offers substantial and multi-year funding.
2 Based only on this criteria, one could expect to observe many more natural resource-rich countries with a SWF. However, many did not establish one.
We use the sudden emergence of new SWFs to test for the role of economic and political factors in their establishments using logistic regressions. We argue that the sudden emergence of SWFs in recent times was triggered by a commodities price boom that was outside of the control of individual countries. As the control group, we use all the countries that have not set up a SWF. The empirical identification relies on strict time-separability where past determinants relate to future establishments.
We find that resource rents are a strong predictor for the establishment of a SWF.
However, these rents become less important once we control for a government's scale of accountability and executive constraint summarised in a single measure of autocracy. Past expenditures on public goods, such as on education, predict a lower probability of establishing a SWF in the future. We interpret this as an indication that on average countries have made a trade-off between domestic and foreign investments. We find that resource rents are a special case as the more general current account turns out to be a statistically insignificant regressor. Similarly, the variables that are robustly related to the probability of establishing a SWF are not similarly related to the countries foreign asset position. The decision to establish a SWF can, therefore, be interpreted as a policy instrument, but does not necessarily correspond directly to actual savings.
Establishing a special purpose fund designed to manage foreign investments, with transparent rules and objectives, is generally considered good policy once a country has evaluated its options between domestic investment and foreign savings (Mohn, 2016; Torvik, 2016) . However, in our data a SWF is more likely to be established by an autocratic government than by a democratic one. Does this indicate that benevolent single rulers have been better in implementing sensible policies than democracies? This may not necessarily be the case once we look at the qualitative characteristics of SWFs. Using measures on the transparency of funds and their investment accountability we find a wide variation.
Additionally, a number of the SWFs that were established during our sample period have a particularly small asset base relative to the potential windfall to the country. This can indicate that these funds may be set up primarily for political reasons rather than for genuine implementation of an optimal saving policy for future generations.
In fact, the surge of SWF establishments in autocratic countries with little experience of market-based investments gave rise to discussion on the potentially international political reasons behind these investments (Johnson, 2007; Kirshner, 2009; Monk, 2009 ). This in turn motivated some stakeholders to call for a regime of 'best practices' that could ensure that government-controlled funds invest for economic and financial reasons in transparent ways. Truman (2008) provided a first set of institutional characteristics, while the SWF Institute produces quarterly a similar rating (Linaburg and Maduell, 2014) . The effect of such funds on the financial markets is in turn analysed by others (Beck and Fidora, 2008; Sun and Hesse, 2009; Kotter and Lel, 2011; In et al., 2013; Gomes, 2008; Bernstein et al., 2013; Ang, 2012) . Neither those looking at the political characteristics of SWFs nor those looking at the financial characteristics of SWFs often take the domestic financial position (from the perspective of the SWF) into account. Those that do, find that domestic politics plays a great role in the final decision of setting up a SWF (Orihuela, 2013; Yi-Chong and Bahgat, 2010) .
3
To our knowledge, no academic contribution on SWFs specifically addresses the question of the emergence of SWFs and of the determinants leading countries to decide to set up such funds. The only notable exception is the paper of Aizenman and Glick (2009) which studies the determinants of the existence in 2007 or 2008 of SWFs. They find that current account surpluses, fuel exports and foreign exchange reserves are significant in explaining the existence of a SWF. They also explore the role of government indicators (proxied by the Worldwide Governance Indicators of Kaufmann et al., 2009) . Our article differs to theirs by using an alternative econometric setup, and a dataset with which we are able to draw stronger causal relationships between economic-political country characteristics and 3 See also the fund profiles given by http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/ natural-resource-funds/, created in cooperation with the National Resource Governance Institute. 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Data range covariates Commodity price index New SWF (right)
Note: The data range represent the period from which we draw the independent variables. All SWFs established between 1998 and 2008 are to be explained with this data.
the establishments of SWFs. We also relate directly to theoretical literature on resource wealth management, and test various predictions suggested in this literature discussed in the next section.
Data, Hypotheses and Methodology
The aim of this research is to understand why some countries have a SWF and others have not. Since some countries established a SWF and others did not, we have a classic binary setup that can be approached by a logit regression. We exploit the 1998-2008 window, when 16 countries established a SWF, to explore the role of a range of potential determinants before this period, taking data from 1997 or the average over several years ending in 1997.
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Information on the years of establishment of the SWFs and on the fund management characteristics were collected from Truman (2008) .
5 Since we look at the country level, where necessary, we summarise the data over the different national SWFs. For instance, for the establishment data we take the earliest year available, for total assets we take the sum over all the funds. As reported in Having identified the period of analysis, the next question is to identify the variables of interest which could explain why countries chose to set up a SWF. We expect that both the domestic political characteristics of a country, and its economic situation will affect the governments decision to set up a SWF, how much to put in the fund, and for which purposes it may be used. We structure these political and economic factors in one condition and four hypotheses. These hypotheses relate to a number of theoretical papers on resource wealth management and focus on various economic and political factors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a theoretical model that could incorporate all of these economic and institutional aspects in one unifying framework. C1: Resource rents increase the probability of observing a SWF.
Having the economic means is a precondition to the ability to save. Since we include all countries of the world for which we have data, this condition serves to make a selection of resource-rich and resource-poor countries.
8 The World Bank provides data on resource rents (oil, gas, metals, phosphates measured in percentage of GDP) as a measure of government revenue from natural resources. Alternatively, we use a measure of resource exports to capture the importance of natural resources for foreign exchange earnings. We also include GDP per capita as a general measure of income level.
H1: Domestic investment substitutes for foreign investments.
Given the resources, a country can decide to spend or invest, while investments in turn may be targeted towards domestic public capital or foreign assets. A SWF is mostly associated with the latter although there are exceptions. Domestic public capital investment is typically conducted directly through government ministries of infrastructure, education and science while government spending is conducted through any public body. Therefore, we expect the probability of SWF to decrease the higher a government's spending on domestic investments, in particular items such as education and infrastructure. The reason that a government might not chose to invest domestically for long-term growth may be related to its limited absorptive capacity relative to the scale of the resource revenues (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2013; van der Ploeg, 2012) . In this case, the optimal policy would be to 'park' the funds for a little while in an investment fund and using only some of the resource revenues to steadily build-up the absorptive capacity of the country.
We look at three variables that may proxy for this factor of domestic investments: a measure of education spending, a measure of general government expenditures, both expressed in % of GDP, and a non-financial measure of infrastructure development. 8 Pre-selecting the sample to include only those with some resource rents does not affect the results materially. Moreover, there is a priori no reason why a country without natural resources would not be able to establish a SWF, indeed we observe a few SWF establishments that fit this case.
9 The interaction between investment in education and natural resource wealth is addressed by Gylfason (2001) and Gylfason and Zoega (2006) . Health expenditures could also be regarded as a form of domestic investments, and may be affected by natural resources windfalls, although Acemoglu et al. (2013) found no such effect in local US data. One complication with using actual health expenditure data is that the correlation between public healthcare spending and health outcomes may not be very strong. Countries focusing spending on sickness prevention and stimulation of healthy behaviour may on average have lower
The attention that has historically been given to the role of education in development makes that international comparable data on education expenditures is now available for most countries, as opposed to spending on other types of public capital. There exists (to our knowledge) no such comparable data on infrastructure. Instead we use a measure of the length of existing roads relative to the population. Government expenditures includes domestic investments as well as government consumption and, therefore, can be expected to capture imperfectly the mechanism of domestic investments.
H2: Government characteristics matter for the establishment of SWFs
The theoretical literature in political economy on natural resources suggest that greater accountability of government as well as well-defined property rights are instrumental for optimal behaviour of consumption, savings and investment in terms of national welfare (Robinson et al., 2006; van der Ploeg, 2010) .
We test this hypothesis formally by relating the measure of democracy of a country to the likelihood of establishing a SWF, while controlling for other economic factors. We do so by creating an indicator variable equal to 1 if the value of polity2 democracy score is between -10 and 0 (more autocratic), and 0 if the score is above 0 (more democratic) (Marshall et al., 2006) . Many oil-exporting countries fall in the autocratic regime category, but note that our sample is not restricted to oil and gas. To account explicitly for the interaction of natural resource revenues and a country's governance structure as discussed in the before mentioned literature, we include such interaction explicitly in the empirical model as well. We will explore in Section 4 the various mechanisms further.
H3: Debt reduction serves as an alternative to establishing a SWF.
Apart from investing in public capital, a government that has a substantial foreign debt may choose to pay this off first before setting up a SWF. In this way, paying off debt is similarly an investment in the public good of a sound national account. Rather spending per capita with better average health outcomes than countries focussing spending on treatment. Therefore we leave health care expenditures out of our analysis, while acknowledging that from a public policy point of view healthcare spending is as important in consideration for domestic investments as education and infrastructure.
than the debt position, it may be that the borrowing costs that matter for the choice of paying down the debt (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2011). However, to our knowledge there is no comprehensive dataset available that collects government borrowing costs for the entire world.
10 We will test this hypothesis instead with measures of the debt stock, and indirectly with the measures on the net financial asset position of the country.
H4: When resource windfalls are subject to future demand and price uncertainty more should be saved.
A SWF can be established to cover a country from volatile resource revenues, by extracting quickly the resources under ground, and transforming the revenues to a predictable long-term revenue flow (van der Ploeg, 2010; van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013; Cherif and Hasanov, 2013) . As measures of uncertainty we calculate the volatility of both the natural resource revenue and a country's GDP using up to 20 years of data.
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We define the left-hand side variable as a dummy equal to 1 if the country established a first SWF in the 1998-2008 window and to 0 otherwise. 12 The variables on the right-hand side are the potential determinants of the emergence of SWFs, as measured at the very beginning of the window. To mitigate a year-specific effect, we computed the determinants as 4-year averages over 1994 -1997 (similar to Aizenman and Glick, 2009 ).
13 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables that we use, divided over countries that did not set up a fund in the period of analysis versus those that did. 14 We find that future SWF countries differ significantly from non-SWF countries in the main variables that we use to test our hypotheses, except for net foreign assets (NFA) and resource rents volatility, while marginally for the polity indicator and resource rents.
10 The 'JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index' goes a long way in this respect, but not all rates for the countries included are measured in the same way, and the dataset excludes all non-emerging markets, particularly developed countries.
11 We define volatility as the standard deviation divided by the mean. 12 Note that Aizenman and Glick (2009) Their focus is not precisely on the emergence of SWFs.
13 Taking the average will also help to fill in some gaps of missing data, allowing to increase the sample. This is especially relevant for models that include data on government expenditures.
14 Table A-2 in the Appendix describes in more details each variable and its source. The benchmark estimating equation can be represented as follows
where SW F i represents a dummy of having established a SWF in the period 1998-2008, while the other regressors indicate past country characteristics that have preceded this decision. We will vary the exact combination and form of the right-hand side variables.
Note that the four independent variables correspond to the Condition 1, and Hypotheses 1 and 2 defined above. We include log(GDP pc i ) as a general control variable for a country's development. For each regression we indicate the number of SWFs in the sample, the Pseudo-R 2 and the log-likelihood.
Given that we allow for the establishment of a SWF in a 10-year period, those established earlier may have a stronger relation to economic and other variables during the 1994-1997 period than those that are established later. Additionally, there is a great heterogeneity between funds, whereby some funds appear to be established for symbolic reasons only as they hold very little assets, while others rank among the biggest in the world. The binary variable for existence is, therefore, a rather crude measure. This potential issue could work against our estimation method. We let the data tell if our model can explain the establishments of SWF.
Moreover, alternative setups may have even greater drawbacks. One alternative is to shorten the window of establishments, for instance by taking only 3 or 5 years since 1998, giving potentially stronger results, but this would reduce the number of observed positives, and, thus, a much narrower scope for the interpretation of the results. Alternatively, a panel setup is possible, whereby past data relates to the setup of a fund in any time.
However, this is not appropriate for our dataset and the question we aim to answer, since a conditional logit estimation (a method to substitute out country fixed determinants) can only exploit information from those countries that change from having no fund to having one somewhere during the time-span we analyse. Therefore, this estimator is unable to compare countries that set up a fund with those that do not. 
Results
The baseline results of model (1) are presented in Table 3 and lead to the following observations.
3.1. C1: Resource rents increase the probability of observing a SWF A country's income level, as measured by log GDP per capita, and natural resource rents correspond positively to the probability of establishing a SWF. Unsurprisingly, as a necessary condition, funding matters.
H1: Domestic investment substitutes for foreign investments
The level of education spending and general government consumption affects negatively the probability of establishing a SWF. This confirms what was suggested by the theoretical literature; a higher domestic level of investment makes future domestic investments more profitable and thereby increases the opportunity cost of establishing a SWF. The nonfinancial measure of infrastructure development indicates the same result, a higher road density relative to the population is associated with a lower probability of setting up a fund.
Conceptually we can make a distinction between government consumption and domestic investment. In reality, it is not easy to observe the difference. For instance, expenditures on eduction are clearly government spending that can be counted as consumption, but equally as investments for long-term growth. In contrast, there might be plenty of government expenditures that we should interpret as (wasteful) consumption rather than genuine attempts for long-term growth. This may include extending the public sector for patronage reasons and expenditures on luxury goods for government officials. On the other hand, money can only be spent once. Therefore, any government expenditures will decrease the amount available for savings. The negative coefficient fits both the story of current consumption and long-term investments. The question then is whether we can disentangle the two mechanisms.
In our dataset, there is more data available for the general government account than the more specific educational expenditures or other parts of the government budget. In the model, individually both relate negatively to the establishment of SWFs (models (3) and (5)), but their coefficients differ, with past educational expenditures indicating a stronger negative effect on the probability of setting up a SWF compared to government consumption. Government expenditures include already the expenditures on education. When we include government expenditures excluding education we find a smaller and insignificant coefficient.
Both education and the infrastructure variable can be viewed as part of the public domestic investment, and both indicators suggest that countries with higher expenditures on these (taking the relative density of roads as a proxy for actual expenditures on infrastructure) are the least likely to set up a fund.
This supports Hypothesis 1 indicating that SWFs may be the result of the inability or unwillingness to invest in the domestic economy. 16 In the following, we continue to include the broader government consumption variable, since it is the most widely available variable and captures the process of government spending and investment well. 
H2: Government characteristics matter for the establishment of SWFs
Political regime matters. Autocratic countries are more likely to establish a SWF than democratic ones. In addition, the interaction term between the dummy for autocratic power and natural resource rents is significant, negative and of an amplitude close to the coefficient on the natural resource rent variable. The interpretation is that the role of natural resource is zero for autocratic countries. In other words, the size of natural resources revenue only matters in democratic countries. Autocratic countries tend to establish SWFs, irrespective of actual size of the rents.
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16 The availability of data cannot be assumed to be completely random in this case. Data on educational expenditures is much scarcer. Those countries that produce such data are probably more likely to value such figures, independent of the actual value, implying that there exist already a certain mechanism for proper government spending. Countries with regimes that aim to hide as much as possible where government money is spent would drop out of the sample.
17 While not reported, a model with education and road/pop together indicates both individually significant at 5% level. Education and government expenditures excluding education jointly in a model are not significant individually at 10% level, but jointly at 1%. Results available from authors.
18 Table B -4 in the Supplementary Appendix gives results for interaction of rents with the other variables. These results indicate that the interaction with regime type is indeed the most important, and results To understand the size of effects for this first set of results we estimate average marginal effects for model (3). Table 4 presents the results. The first column gives the result of a linear probability model (LPM) using the same sample and model as the other columns.
Column two gives the figures for the average marginal effect over the sample using the logit.
These coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a unit change of x on the probability of observing a SWF, similar to the coefficients of the LPM. For instance, an increase by 1 percentage point of the resource rents-to-GDP ratio would increase the probability of observing a SWF by 1.25%. This is a sizeable effect for those countries that experience a significant boom. The income figure implies that rising income per capita strongly increases the probability of observing a fund, which underlines that a fund is principally a savings instrument. The coefficient on expenditure on education indicates that an increase by 1 percentage point of the educational expenditures-to-GDP ratio decreases the probability of observing a SWF in the future. These two factors, income and education, underline the opposing effects of saving due to increased income and domestic investment for the benefit of economic development. Relative to the LPM, the estimated effects from the logit model of rents is smaller, while that on education bigger, but the magnitude and sign are broadly in line.
In columns (3) and (4) we compare the coefficients over democratic and non-democratic governments. This comparison allows to show the interactive effect that this government cannot be attributed to some general non-linearity of the rents data.
characteristic has on all the determinants due to the non-constant marginal effects in the logit model. The marginal effects for democratic governments are very similar to the average marginal effects, although the effect of resource rents has slightly decreased, while for income it has slightly increased. For non-democratic countries, however, the marginal effects are very different. The estimates indicate that resource rents are not related to the establishment of a fund, in line with the observation in Table 3 . Apparently there are enough countries in the sample that establish a fund while our data indicates that their rents are only marginal in the period before.
19 Income per capita still has a significant coefficient. The effect on resource rents disappears in line with the observation in Table   3 . The estimate for educational expenditures is larger compared to democratic regimes indicating that the trade-off between public expenditures or savings is much stronger in autocratic regimes relative to democratic countries.
3.4. H3: Debt reduction serves an an alternative to establishing a SWF Table 5 explores the role of a complementary set of regressors (on top of our benchmark regression (Table 3 model (5)) related to the funding of SWFs, namely the current account balance (Curr. acc.), the stock of government debt (Debt), the net financial assets (NFA) and the foreign exchange reserves (FX res). As different measures for economic surpluses, we expect current account surpluses and large positive net financial assets to be positively correlated to the probability of setting up a SWF, while debt should be negatively correlated corresponding to Hypothesis H3.
We find in Table 5 that these additional regressors do not bring much to the benchmark model. They are not statistically significant at the usual levels, meaning that natural resource rents and log GDP per capita (pc) are sufficient to capture the funding component.
20 Surprisingly, the debt stock appears to play no general role in the prediction for a SWF.
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19 This could also be because some countries were forward looking, setting up a fund before the rents started flowing.
20 Other variables were included of which results are not presented, such as household consumption as percentage of GDP (in case there is a trade off between government and private household spending and savings, as well as gross savings as a percentage of GDP. Neither were significant nor affected the other variables. Excluding government consumption from the model does not change the results.
21 Additional results on the role of debt are presented in the Supplementary Appendix in Table B -5, 3.5. H4: When resource windfalls are subject to future demand and price uncertainty more should be saved
We finally include a measure for economic risk, corresponding to Hypothesis 4. We use the 20-years volatility of rents and GDP per capita, as proxies for the future uncertainty.
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Volatility in the economy or from the resource rents creates an incentive for additional precautionary saving. Setting up a SWF would contribute to achieving a smoother income stream from volatile receipts. However, volatility might also give scope to abuse as changing indicating that the effect of external debt may be sensitive to sample selection. Arezki and Brückner (2012) found that there may be a particular heterogeneity in the responds to resource windfall on external debts between democracies and non-democracies. 22 We experimented with shorter samples, which give qualitatively similar results.
prices and production give opportunity for back-channelling receipts to those in power.
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We find in Table 5 that volatility of rents is positively associated to the establishment of SWFs, but not volatility of GDP.
Alternative specifications
We collect in the Supplementary Appendix alternative specifications of our main results.
We looked at the role of income inequality (Appendix AppendixB.1), alternative resource measures (Appendix AppendixB.2), functional form specifications and sample selection (Appendix AppendixB.3). Finally, we also conducted a duration analysis, which exploits the time dimension of the decision to establish a SWF (Appendix AppendixB.4).
The meaning of SWF establishments
While our empirical model on SWF establishments is robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables and sample selection, what the binary indicator means by itself, and how our model relates to differences in the characteristics of SWFs, is still to be clarified.
Therefore, we start by investigating whether we can take our indicator variable as a measure of national savings decision. Secondly, we will investigate how the likelihood of established SWFs reflects on their observed institutional quality. Thirdly, taking into account that there is a political process behind the establishment we look into various channels that underlie our autocracy variable, in particular whether measures of legal constraints on the executives and protection of property rights relate to the establishment of SWFs.
Do our independent variables predict public savings?
As SWFs are principally mechanisms to save and manage natural resource proceeds, 23 Ideally, we may wish to use more recent measures of volatility or even of expected volatility as a better measure for uncertainty. As of yet we have no such measures available. In contrast, 20 years past data should give a very conservative estimate for this uncertainty measure. We found no effect for the standard deviation of rents instead of the volatility measure. these variables are continuous variables we can use simple OLS to estimate these models.
As in the previous tables, we indicate for each sample the number of countries that have a
SWF.
The results indicate that the variables we identified as explanatory variables for the SWFs, have in general much less, if any, explanatory power on the status of a country's financial position. The exception are GDP per capita and the current account, which contribute significantly and positively to the net foreign asset position. If national savings, as an economic policy, is a political decision, it might be expected that government consumption, resource rents, as well as the government autocracy indicator would be strongly related to these measures. We find no evidence for this in contrast to the models on SWF establishment. Therefore, these results indicate that the emergence of SWFs is the result of a very different process from balancing savings with respect to the rest of the world.
SWF characteristics
Our next step is to draw on additional information on the established SWFs to gain some further understanding on the variation between funds. The limited number of exist- ing or newly established funds precludes any informative and robust statistical analysis.
Nevertheless, it helps to look graphically to some of their characteristics in relation to the results we found above.
Firstly, we calculated the predicted probability for the establishment of a SWF from Table 3 model (5). Subsequently, we plotted this probability against the total size (measured by the total non-pension assets), fraction in foreign assets, 'accountability/transparency' (measuring "the accountability and transparency of the fund in its investment strategy, investment activities, reporting, and audits") and 'behaviour' (measuring "behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and in the use of leverage and derivatives", i.e. a measure of sophistication of the investment activities) (Truman (2008, p.6) ). 24 We included in the plots all funds, including those established before 1998 as well as pension funds, allowing the observation of difference between such funds with respect to recent resource-funded SWFs.
The establishment of a SWF and its characteristics, such as its management, reporting obligations and funding schedule are likely to be jointly decided. Since the predicted probabilities of SWF establishment are a function of our independent variables, the charts indicate how these predicted values correlate with some measures of SWF characteristics.
We see in the upper left plot that size (in terms of total non-pension assets) is not related to the probability of the SWFs (ignoring the Singapore SWF, which actually has no natural resource rents, there is no real pattern). 25 This is interesting since the size of resource rents by itself was found to be positively related to the probability of SWF establishment. In general, countries with some of the largest rents have a fund that is rather small. We then see in the upper right plot that the largest funds, outside the Gulf With respect to the quality of these funds structure and behaviour there is an interesting pattern as well to see in lower left and right plots. Countries with a high predicted probability of a SWF tend to have decreasing scores on the measures of 'accountability/transparency' and 'behaviour'. Pension funds score generally higher on these ratings than SWFs. It serves as a stark contrast that those countries that have the highest pre- Finally, it is interesting to include all countries including those that that never established a SWF. Figure 4 can reveal the false positives, as well as correct negatives. On the "false positives" side, say above 40%, we have Turkmenistan (TKM), Indonesia (IDN), Guinea Bissau (GNB) and Switzerland (CHE).
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On the side of correct negatives we have Angola (AGO), Republic of Congo (COG) and Equatorial Guinea (GNQ) with sizeable resource rents but no SWF, while the predicted probability is also low.
27 The score for Angola is low because the resource rent impact is cancelled out by its non-democratic structure. It scores below average on the education, spending around 2.5% of GDP. A similar explanation holds for Congo, which on top of that has a lower income per capita measure. Table 7 looks further into the channels of the political regime determinants. In the discussion on the hypotheses in Section 2, we indicated that political accountability and well defined property rights are important determinants for policy decisions on managing resource revenue. PolityIV has measures that indicate competition both for the executive and for political parties. Political competition, for instance through term limits of office and electoral processes, implies that politicians can be held accountable for their decisions.
Political channels
The results in Table 7 are consistent with this channel. The higher the measure of 27 Angola actually has set up a SWF in 2012, so fell out of our estimation sample of 1998-2008. executive regulation (xrreg), executive competition (xrcomp), and political competition (parcomp), the less likely a country is to establish a fund. The same interaction with rents found before holds here as well. A higher value of rents, will decrease the effect of rents on the decision to establish a fund.
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Discussion
In summary, we find that countries are more likely to set up a SWF if they have natural resources or are autocratic, while the opportunity for domestic investments make them less likely to do so. Secondly, we find no evidence that the same drivers affect countries' asset position. Thirdly, the probability of establishing a fund correlates negatively with transparency and governance quality indicators. Fourthly, there is a strong political channel related to the SWF, indicating that autocratic countries, particularly through indicators of accountability and protection of private property rights, are more likely to establish a SWF.
In combination, we view these findings as suggestive evidence that many established SWF were not established from a public benefit point of view. However, we cannot say, with the evidence that we have collected, that SWFs were on average good or bad for a country. We concentrated on the determinants of SWF establishments, not their effects on, or use in, domestic policy making.
Comparing Chile's with Peru's experience of natural resource wealth management, Orihuela (2013) highlights that different historical experiences and geographical aspects, as well as other country and time specific circumstances, all contribute to the way governments and experts, such as local economists, were able and prepared to think about policy on natural resource wealth management. While our results can indicate that on average SWFs are established while taking past economic circumstances into account, their character, in terms of transparency and behaviour, were, at least initially, more reflective of countries' existing institutions.
That the characteristics of SWFs reflect domestic institutions, which in turn may or may not have been affected by natural resources, relates to other studies looking to model the interaction of natural resources, institutional quality and public capital investments (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Cabrales and Hauk, 2011), or the level of democracy (e.g. Ross, 2001; Haber and Menaldo, 2011) . Torvik (2016) considers theoretically how the choice between domestic investments and savings through a fund are related to existing institutions (e.g. quality of government and rent-seeking behaviour) and may in turn reinforce each other. One simplification of this model is that a fund will always stimulate rent seeking, while domestic investment in 'non-lootable' capital, such as education, breeds good future institutions. The reality is of course not as simple, domestic investment projects might very well be wasted into 'white elephants' (Robinson and Torvik, 2005) , while well managed and accountable funds, following international auditing standards, may not be necessarily detrimental to political institutions.
Furthermore, institutions are not fixed in time, and neither are the characteristics of the SWFs included in our sample. As Figure 3 demonstrates, there appears a general improvement of standards among SWFs. This stands in contrast to the example given in Torvik (2016) of Chad, looting its World Bank supported SWF for military purposes.
Continuous monitoring and technical assistance by NGOs and multilateral organisations remain key requirements, especially when the initial country's institutions are not sufficient to guarantee the optimal use of the funds under management.
Conclusion
We presented evidence on the determinants for the establishment of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Based on recent literature on optimal policies for savings and investments of resource rich-countries, we hypothesised the role of the key variables. We find that both economic and political aspects play an important role and interact.
Our results suggest that SWFs from non-democratic regimes are probably not established to be politically active in foreign countries. Instead, their emergence points to defects at origin: the inability, or unwillingness to direct the funds towards improving the domestic economy. Discussions should, therefore, continue on why SWFs hold most of their funds in foreign investments, while improving the domestic investment climate may reap much higher benefits.
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Our results on fund establishments are in line with the literature that debates the different strategies of harnessing resource windfalls given the choice between international investments and domestic investment opportunities. Domestic characteristics are a strong determinant of SWFs establishments. A trade-off between economic and rivalrous rentseeking is also confirmed. This suggests again that the resource rents are currently not always used for the benefit of the development of the country.
Looking at the qualitative ratings attributed to SWFs over the years, we found that countries that have particularly large resource rents to manage typically have established small and operationally opaque SWF. However, these ratings have improved over time suggesting that the potential for SWF to be used for a countries general welfare appears to have increased. This is relevant for the future. Even if our results suggest that initially Primary commodities (% total exports) over [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] UNCTADstat (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 68) xrreg regulation of chief executive recruitment Polity IV Project xrcomp competitiveness of executive recruitment Polity IV Project parcomp the competitiveness of participation Polity IV Project Note. The regressions are performed on 5-year averages (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) of the explanatory variables (Rents, Log GDPpc, Edu. exp., road/pop, Gov. cons., Curr. acc., Debt, NFA, FXRes, Gini, Log GDPpc/(100-Gini), Natural gas rents, Oil rents). Since UNCTAD data are only available from 1995, Commodity Exp. is a 4-year average (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) .
AppendixA. SWFs Overview and Data sources
AppendixB. Supplementary Appendix
AppendixB.1. Role of income inequality
We may suspect that income per capita will not capture to what extent this income is spread over the entire population, whereas oil rents are often concentrated towards an elite. Hence, we may suspect that in societies where income or wealth is more unequally distributed are more likely to set up a SWF as the elite will make this decision for themselves rather than for the people. Table B -1 shows that inequality -as measured by the GINIcoefficient-seems to play a marginal role. 
AppendixB.2. Alternative resource rent proxies
We present some alternatives in the measures of the rents in Table B -2. The World Bank provides figures for oil and gas separately. We find that the mechanism holds for both types of rents, but is stronger for natural gas. The sample size is greatly reduced for this measure, nonetheless the estimates are very much in line with the main results.
Additionally, we created our own resource wealth measure based on trade statistics, which measures the percentage of primary commodities in total trade. One drawback of the rents measure is that it does not capture whether the resource is used for domestic consumption or mostly exported, while SWFs are often related to exported commodities.
We find that the export measure offers consistent results. While not significant at the conventional levels, the coefficients on the resource measure and interaction with political regime indicate the same process. Nevertheless, the impact of commodity exports is distinctively smaller, and coefficient on the interaction with regime type does not indicate the same relation as we find for the resource rents given that it distinctively smaller still (in absolute value) relative to the direct export variable. In Table B -5 we present further results on the affect of national debt in our model. In the main text we concluded that debt has an statistically insignificant effect. We show here that the effect of debt appears to be sensitive to sample selection. When restricting the sample to the same countries for which we government consumption and education data, the effect of debt is statistically significant and the sign intuitive: higher debt dissuades from the decision of setting up a savings fund, suggesting that paying off external debt is prioritised.
In table B-6 we present the benchmark results over a constant (minimal) sample. Size and standard errors are little effected. In figure B-1 we present an alternative test on sample selection by plotting the main coefficients and standard errors while sequentially leaving one country out. The results are generally stable, while the occasional peaks are predominantly away from zero. Edu. exp.
Note: graphs indicate coefficient on the regressors whilst excluding one observation per estimation, shaded area is 95% confidence interval. The variables refer to the five regressors in the benchmark model, non-democrat is the dummy, "rent nond" is the interaction of non-democracy with rents, "ne con gov zs" is Government consumption. .
AppendixB.4. Duration analysis
Our data also allows us to do duration analysis, where we model the distribution of the time it takes to set up a SWF. Technically, we interpret our data as a stock sample with right censoring, since we take all countries that have no SWF in 1997, as the start of the spell, while not all countries will set up a SWF at the time our time period of analysis ends.
For this reason duration models are interesting in our case since the feature of censoring allows us to take into account those countries without a SWF. We will present here just standard (parametric) duration models that fall in the proportional hazard class. The proportional hazard models imply that our covariates of interest are limited in shifting the hazard function (interpretable as the probability of failure at date t, given survival up to t − 1) up or down over the entire time scale (i.e. the proportional effect of covariates do not change over time).
We report in Table B-7 (1) and (2) and lead to conclusions similar to those obtained in the benchmark table with a positive impact of funding (GDP per capita and resource rents are significant) and of autocracy, an interaction term between autocracy and resource rents that indicate that resources no longer matter in an autocratic country and a negative impact of government expenses (same results for education expenses -not reported in the Table) . For the sake of comparability with previous tables, the last column restricts the data on SWFs to the 1998-2008 periods, which keeps results unchanged, but increases slightly the estimates for the unconditional trend, suggesting that more and more SWFs are likely to be observed as time passes. However, comparingα among the different models, indicates that the rate of SWF establishments is neither increasing nor decreasing with time (none of the estimated parameters is significantly different from 1). 
